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Decisions about targeting medical assistance in humanitarian contexts are fraught with dilemmas ranging from
non-availability of basic services, to massive demographic and epidemiological shifts, and to the threat of inse-
curity and evacuations. Aid agencies are obliged, due to capacity constraints and competing priorities, to clearly
deﬁne the objectives and the beneﬁciaries of their actions. That aid agencies have to set limits to their actions is
not controversial, but the process of deﬁning the limits raises ethical questions. In MSF, frameworks for resource
allocation are subject to constant reﬂection and reiteration, and perspectives are sought at all levels, from imple-
mentersattheprogrammeleveltotheoperationaldirectorsatheadquarters.Theperspectivesoftheprogrammes
staﬀholdconsiderableweightastheyhavetheknowledgeandexperiencewithparticularcommunitiestoassess
the degree of vulnerability and need, and are also the people who ultimately have to give explanations to ben-
eﬁciaries when changes or closures are going to be instituted. Humanitarian agencies have a responsibility to
ensuringthattheirworkersarepreparedtoreﬂectonthesedilemmas,andchallengethestatusquowhenitcosts
lives.
For doctors used to practicing medicine in the well-
resourcedWesternworld,humanitarianemergenciesare
extraordinary situations. Health professionals who nor-
mally rely on a panoply of routine diagnostic tests, ther-
apeutic options and specialist colleagues are transported
to highly impoverished areas with collapsed health ser-
vices, limited human resources and an excessive burden
of infectious and chronic diseases. In extreme situations
of isolation and insecurity, a modest team of expatriate
health workers equipped with a limited supply of essen-
tial medicines and clinical algorithms may represent, for
the limited duration of their presence, the only health
professionals in the area. In zones of active conﬂict—the
traditional terrain of humanitarian assistance—the pro-
vision of relief is further complicated by unpredictable
violence and insecurity. Decisions about how to target
medical assistance are fraught with dilemmas ranging
from non-availability of basic tools, to massive demo-
graphic and epidemiological shifts, to the possibility of
having to evacuate at any moment.
The starting point for any decision about how, where,
and when to intervene in a humanitarian crisis is the
institutional mandate that deﬁnes the scope of human-
itarian assistance provided by a particular organization.
Mandates can vary enormously in the breadth of ac-
tivities they lay out, from the all-encompassing to the
speciﬁc. So while Oxfam aims to ‘ﬁnd lasting solu-
tions to poverty and injustice’ M´ edecins Sans Fronti` eres
(MSF) deﬁnes itself as an organization that ‘delivers
emergency aid to people affected by armed conﬂict,
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epidemics, healthcare exclusion and natural or man-
made disasters’.
From an operational perspective institutions are
obliged, due to capacity constraints and a multiplicity
of competing priorities, to select speciﬁc sites of inter-
vention and clearly deﬁne their objectives and the ben-
eﬁciaries of their actions. This is essential to ensuring
that operations are focused and have the best chance
of achieving the expected results, while ensuring main-
taining capacity to intervene in other crises. Operational
interventions are thus clearly guided by a priori choices
before getting to the ﬁeld. For an international humani-
tarian organization, a decision to assist cholera patients
inJubaisnotonlyadecisiontosingleoutaparticulardis-
ease (Devakumar, 2008). Itisalsoa decision tointervene
in Juba (a region in Sudan), as opposed to other areas
in Sudan; to deploy human and ﬁnancial resources in
Sudan instead of other counties in crisis; and to provide
health care as opposed to other humanitarian services
(water, shelter, nutrition).
At what point does a crisis become a humanitarian
intervention? The science is far from perfect. A decision
to intervene is often based on little more than a crude
measurement of population-level mortality; a doubling
of existing mortality rates is often used as an arbitrary
threshold for declaring an emergency situation (Sphere
Project, 2004). But often, mortality per se provides in-
sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for a particular NGO to intervene
in a given context, and the presence of other associated
factors, e.g., vulnerable groups (children, the elderly),
exclusion from access to health care, media or donor
pressure and political choices can all inﬂuence the deci-
sion to intervene (Checchi et al., 2007).
The primary causes of mortality—violence, malnu-
trition and infectious diseases—may deﬁne the initial
operational response, but when other life-threatening
conditions are confronted, and if the means are avail-
able, it would seem fairly clear that a health professional
is duty-bound to respond. But again, the means that are
availableareoftenconditionedbyorganizationalapriori
choices. The case study from Juba accepts that certain
interventions like surgery could not be done, but is this
any more acceptable than referring non-cholera cases?
How much surgical disease is required before the lack of
surgicalcarebecomesanethicaldilemmaandshouldthis
automatically become the responsibility of an NGO who
maybeintheareawithacompletelydifferentoperational
mandate? An emergency intervention can become even
more complicated when health teams are faced with a
pressing burden of chronic disease. In most humanitar-
ian contexts in Africa, health care workers will inevitably
beconfrontedwithHIV,alife-threateningdiseaserequir-
ing treatment for life. In the absence of some limiting
criteria, a time-bound emergency cholera intervention
could evolve into a programme providing surgical care
andanti-retroviraltherapy.Healthprofessionalsreacting
to the ‘moral duty’ to treat could rapidly exceed the or-
ganizations’ technical and ﬁnancial capacity, preventing
action in other crisis areas.
The reality is that there is very poor guidance for
decision-making about resource allocation at a public
health level (Kass, 2001). Because of this, health work-
ers most often appeal to medical ethics, viewing these
dilemmas exclusively at the level of the doctor–patient
relationship. But when a doctor working for an interna-
tionalagencyinaremotepartofAfricaisconfrontedwith
apathologytheycannotrespondtofortechnicalreasons,
or reasons of limited mandate, this situation is not sim-
ply a medical ethical dilemma. Rather, the situation is
conditioned by dynamics that run from the micro-level
(bedside)tothemeso-andmacro-level(institutionsand
health systems) (Sreenivasan and Benater, 2006).
These dynamics can run in both directions. It is not
onlyamatterofadoctorinaremoteareasituatingthem-
selves within the broader landscape of international hu-
manitarianneeds—thestreamofinﬂuencecanrunfrom
the bottom up. It was the voice of frustration of doc-
tors not being able to treat HIV that convinced MSF to
launchtreatmentprogrammesacrossAfrica.Tobeableto
treatpatientsontheground,theorganizationhadtoﬁrst
engageinaconsiderablenumberofmacro-levelfora,in-
cludinglobbyingpharmaceuticalcompaniestolowerthe
price of their drugs, convincing UN agencies that treat-
ment should be provided as well as prevention, pushing
donorgovernmentstoputmoneyintoHIVprogrammes,
andconvincingnationalgovernmentstoallowpilotpro-
grammes to proceed. Indeed, it is often this advocacy
work that allows humanitarian workers to live with the
relative imperfections of operational decision-making.
NGOs can often not do more than make a temporary
contributiontosavinglivesandrestoringthedignityofa
small number of individuals, but by demonstrating that
action is possible, and holding others to account, it may
be possible to ensure that a broader, more sustainable
improvement in peoples’ lives is made.
The provision of anti-retrovirals in Africa provides
one of the few examples where attempts have been made
to deﬁne criteria for decision taking on resource allo-
cation at the international public health level (Daniels,
2005). The decision of who to treat rests primarily on
clinical grounds,with patients with lower immunitypri-
oritized. While the use of clinical criteria as a basis for
rationingcareappearstomakesenseatﬁrstglance,clini-
cal criteria have been used in the past to mask moral andDEFINING THE LIMITS OF EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ACTION • 3
socialjudgmentsmadeintherationingofpenicillin,liver
transplants and renal dialysis (McGough et al., 2005).
Any single criterion is going to be imperfect, so the pro-
cess of deﬁning criteria, and the involvement of a broad
rangeofstakeholdersisessential(Rosenetal.,2005).But
asthecholeracasestudynotes,communitymembersare
generally not parties to MOUs and rightly perceive the
possibilityofcarewhentheyseeredcrossesandotherin-
dicators of the presence of health care providers. Raising
community awareness on the rationale and mandate for
a given humanitarian intervention particularly when it
isselective(inthiscasecholera) wouldseemaminimum
and worthwhile responsibility. Communities should not
be the agents bearing responsibility for any mispercep-
tion of mandates.
Limit setting is one of the greatest ethical challenges
in health care delivery (Coulter and Ham, 2000). The
fact that humanitarian organizations have to set limits
to their actions is not controversial; rather, the process
of deﬁning the limits raises ethical questions. It has been
proposed that such a process should take into account
the following issues: limit setting should be discussed
in the context of practice, and not in isolation; they
can give rise to true ethical dilemmas, where the best
available option is the ‘least worst’ and not an ideal so-
lution; and they can give rise to disagreement and this
shouldberespectedgiventheabsenceofauniversallyac-
cepted ethical framework (Hurst, 2005). All three condi-
tions are present in MSF’s operational decisions-making
processes. Frameworks for resource allocation, for ex-
ample to help determine how much operational activ-
ity should be devoted to responding to conﬂicts versus
chronic diseases like HIV/AIDS, are subject to constant
reﬂection and reiteration, and perspectives are sought at
all levels, from implementers at the programme level to
operationaldirectorsatheadquarters.Whiledecisionsre-
gardingresourceallocationareultimatelytakenbyhead-
quarters, the perspectives of programmes staff tend to
hold considerable weight as it is understood that they
have the best necessary knowledge and experience with
particularcommunitiestoassessthedegreeofvulnerabil-
ityandneed,andtheyarealsothepeoplewhoultimately
have to give explanations to beneﬁciaries when changes
orclosuresaregoingtobeinstituted(Fuller,2006).Thus,
debate and disagreement is actively encouraged, but the
objective is to ensure transparency, accountability and
justiﬁcation in decision-making; consensus seeking does
not supersede the need to act.
Finally,humanitarianagencieshavearesponsibilityto
ensuring that their workers are better prepared to reﬂect
on these dilemmas and challenge the status quo when it
costs lives. Global health has matured to the point that
developed world clinicians working on the front line in
the developing world should not be surprised by the vast
health needs outside the mandate of their program. In-
deed, planning for interventions in under-resourced ar-
easshouldnowfactorinsuchpossibilitiesaspartoftheir
interventions,andprovidersneedpre-departurebrieﬁng
onexpectedconditionsinformedbyepidemiologyinor-
dertomitigate,tosomeextent,thedistresscausedbythe
mismatch between the organizational mandate and the
groundrealities.Whilethisissuehasbeenethicallyprob-
lematic in research contexts as witnessed by the debate
on ancillary care obligations, it bears thorough foresight
on the part of organizations pledged to serving health
needs in humanitarian crises.
Institutionalmandatesareimportantformanagingre-
sourcesandsettinglimitsforaction,whichisanessential
way to ensuring that an organization maintains capacity
to respond to a range of crises. But ultimately, mandates
are self-endowed and therefore revisable. If they repeat-
edlyfailtostimulateorevenhinderanadequateresponse
to the priority health needs of populations in crisis, then
they should be called into question.
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